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Argument 
I. Plaintiff's Complaint States a Claim for Breach of Contract. 
In its brief, Defendant Layton City relies on red herrings in an attempt to get 
away from the applicable standard of review in this matter. In attempting to argue 
that no claim for breach of contract has been pled, Defendant argues that the 
word "contract" was never used in the Complaint and that no copy of any written 
contract or personnel policy was attached to the Complaint, nor specific language 
cited from the policies at issue. (Br. of Appellee at 13-15.)1 However, this 
argument disregards the liberal pleading standard established by the Rules of 
Civil Procedure and has no support in the Governmental Immunity Act. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-5(1 )(2003) stated, "Immunity from suit of all 
government entities is waived as to any contractual obligation. Actions arising 
out of contractual rights or obligations shall not be subject to the requirements of 
[this act.]" The Governmental Immunity Act waives the notice requirement for 
actions arising out of contractual obligations without setting forth specific pleading 
requirements. It does not require specific words in the complaint, nor does it 
require citation to contractual language, nor attachment of specific contractual 
defendant also asserts that Plaintiff acknowledged in interrogatory 
responses that her claims were tort based. (Br. of Appellee at 15.) To the 
contrary, the footnote merely argued that even if both tort and contract damages 
were sought, the contract damages should still be permitted absent a Notice of 
Claim under the Governmental Immunity Act. Moreover, nowhere in Plaintiffs 
interrogatory responses from federal court does she suggest that her claims are 
based in tort. (Exhibit A, Interrogatory Responses.) 
1 
provisions. The act simply eliminates the notice requirements when a claim 
arises out of contractual rights or obligations. 
Absent any indication that the act requires more, the standard pleading 
rules under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure apply. Under these rules, a 
pleader need only provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). These rules have been 
interpreted "to afford parties 'the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate 
contentions they have pertaining to their dispute,' subject only to the requirement 
that their adversary have 'fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the 
claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.'" Williams v. State 
Farm Ins. Co.. 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982)(Citations omitted.) 
The liberal nature of the pleading rules are further illustrated by the 
standard of review employed by the appellate court in reviewing motions to 
dismiss under Utah R. Civ. P. 12. In its review, this Court "assume[s] the 
allegations to be true" and "liberally construe[s] all reasonable inferences arising 
therefrom in determining whether a claim for relief has been stated." Despain v. 
Despain. 682 P.2d 849, 850 (Utah 1984). This Court reviews the dismissal 
assuming the allegations in the Complaint are true and drawing all reasonable 
inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See. Patterson v. American 
Fork City. 2003 UT 7, fl9, 67 P.3d 466. Dismissal is only appropriate where "the 
plaintiff... would not be entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under any state 
2 
of facts they could prove to support their claim." Prows v. State. 822 P.2d 764, 
766 (Utah 1991). Accordingly, a Complaint must give the opposing party a 
"general indication of the type of litigation involved" and allege sufficient facts to 
support their claim. 
The Complaint filed by Plaintiffs in this matter meets the liberalized 
pleading standards of the Rules of Civil Procedure in setting forth a claim for relief 
arising from a contractual obligation. Indeed, Plaintiffs Complaint is abundantly 
clear in setting forth the nature and basis of the claim for relief. After setting forth 
the factual background of Plaintiffs employment and the controversy in 1ffl4-11; 
14-15, Plaintiff clearly sets forth that her Complaint sounds in violation of written 
city policy. Plaintiff states claims in 1ffl12,13, and 17 that Defendant Layton City's 
actions violated its own written policies. These allegations fairly apprised 
Defendant of the nature of the claims and have contractual significance under 
Utah law, as set forth in Plaintiffs opening brief. 
The question which therefore remains is whether these facts as alleged, 
when deemed true and viewing all reasonable inferences in the light most 
favorable to Plaintiff give rise to a contract claim. In Utah, an employer's written 
3 
personnel policies can create an implied employment contract.2 See, e.g.. 
Berube v. Fashion Centre. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989). Plaintiff's 
Complaint expressly alleges constructive termination in violation of written city 
policy. If proved, these facts give rise to a contract claim against Defendant 
Layton City. 
Defendant also suggests that Plaintiff's Complaint is insufficient for failure 
to allege facts that would support a determination either that Plaintiff performed 
under the contract, or that Defendant breached the contract. This argument rests 
on Defendant's contention that Plaintiff freely resigned. However, the allegations 
of the Complaint are plainly different. The Complaint alleges performance by 
virtue of paragraph 4, which states that Plaintiff worked for Defendant Layton City 
in excess of thirteen (13) years. Likewise, Plaintiff's allegation in paragraph 14 
that she was forced to resign does not negate her prior performance, but alleges 
a breach on the part of the city in the nature of her constructive termination. This, 
in addition to several allegations of failure to comply with written city policy, is one 
of several allegations establishing breach of the city's contractual obligations. 
For these reasons, the district court and Court of Appeals erred in 
2Defendant suggests that this policy is inapplicable in the case at bar 
because none of the reported cases from Utah involve public employees. 
However, Defendant cites no caselaw that creates such a distinction, nor any 
argument as to why such a distinction should be made. Indeed persuasive 
authority, such as Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District. 918 P.2d 7, 
11 (N.M. 1996), cited in Plaintiff's initial brief, stands for the proposition that no 
such distinction should be made. 
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concluding that the Complaint did not state a cause of action for breach of 
contract. Plaintiff having stated a claim for breach of contractual obligations in its 
Complaint was not required to comply with the notice provisions of the 
Governmental Immunity Act. Therefore, the decisions of the lower courts should 
be reversed. 
II. Plaintiff's Employment Rights Were Not Grounded in Statute. 
Defendant Layton City argues alternatively that even if the Complaint sets 
forth a contract claim, by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-815, any rights Plaintiff 
may have had were statutory, as opposed to contractual. Utah Code Ann. § 10-
3-815 states, "The governing body of each municipality shall prescribe rules and 
regulations which are not inconsistent with the laws of this state, as it deems best 
for the efficient administration, organization, operation, conduct, and business of 
the municipality." It is ironic, given Defendant's urging of this Court to so closely 
scrutinize Plaintiffs Complaint for details and particular words, that Defendant 
would read so much into a one sentence statute. 
Section 10-3-815 makes no reference to employment rights of city 
employees. The section contains no language which limits the contractual 
significance or effects of a city's actions. It does no more than authorize a city to 
establish rules or regulations, where otherwise the statutory authority would not 
exist. The statute's language is plain and unambiguous and Defendant cites no 
5 
caselaw that would give the statute a more expansive interpretation. Moreover, 
Plaintiffs research reflects that not so much as one case has ever cited to this 
statute since its adoption by the Legislature in 1977. 
Defendant appears to be using Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-815 in an effort to 
relate this matter to distinguishable Court of Appeals decisions. See. Kniaht v. 
Salt Lake County. 2002 UT App 100, 46 P.3d 247; Horn v. Utah Dep't. of Public 
Safety. 962 P.2d 95 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). As set forth more fully in Plaintiffs 
opening brief these cases differ fundamentally because the statutes at issue in 
Kniaht and Horn contain extensive language dealing with employees' rights and 
providing for statutory, as opposed to contractual appeals procedures.3 
Nevertheless, this caselaw recognizes that an agreement which alters or adds to 
the terms and conditions of public employment can create contractual 
responsibilities. See. Knight, at fl8. 
In this case, the Complaint alleges that the city's written personnel policies 
created specific rights, which are not embodied in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-815, 
nor in the Utah Municipal Code. These include regulations related to sick time 
benefits (paragraph 12), city regulations related to equal treatment of employees 
(paragraph 13), and city regulations related to proportionate punishment and 
discipline (paragraph 14). These allegations, accepted as true on review of a 
3See. Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-33-1, et seq.; Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19a-1, et 
seq. 
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Motion to Dismiss, establish alterations or additions to the at-will terms and 
conditions of public employment, and in turn contractual rights and 
responsibilities. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim is not statutory, but arises from 
contractual obligations, and therefore is not subject to dismissal for failure to 
provide a notice of claim. 
III. Plaintiffs Claim Is Not Subject to Dismissal Under the Doctrine of Res 
Judicata. 
Defendant Layton City cannot properly raise the defense of res judicata at 
this stage of the proceedings. This Court has stated, "Review on certiorari is 
limited to examining the court of appeals' decision and is further circumscribed by 
the issues raised in the petitions." Coulter & Smith. Ltd. v. Russell. 966 P.2d 852, 
856 (Utah 1998). Issues raised in the petitions are further limited to those 
included in the order granting certiorari. See. DeBry v. Noble. 889 P.2d 428,443 
(Utah 1995). Only issues so limited, or those fairly contained in the issues so 
identified, are considered on certiorari. See, Coulter & Smith, at 856. 
In this case, Plaintiffs Petition Writ for Certiorari identified three questions 
for review: (1) whether Plaintiffs claims were subject to the notice provisions of 
the Governmental Immunity Act, (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in 
determining that public employees' rights generally spring from statute, not 
contract, and (3) whether dismissal with prejudice was proper without allowing 
7 
Plaintiff the opportunity to amend her Complaint. No further issues were raised in 
Defendant's response to the petition, nor was a cross-petition filed. 
Subsequently, this Court limited the issues for review to the following: "Whether 
petitioner's complaint stated a sufficient claim for the existence of, and violation 
of, a contract with the respondent that was not subject to the immunity and notice 
of claim provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act." (Exhibit B, Order 
granting petition.) Defendant's arguments concerning res judicata are not 
encompassed in the issue before this Court on certiorari, nor are they fairly 
contained within that issue. The arguments should be accordingly disregarded. 
Defendants arguments are further limited by Rule 8. Under Utah R. Civ. P. 
8(c), "In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively... 
res judicata ..." Under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h), with limited exceptions, "A party 
waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or by answer 
or reply..." If res judicata is not raised in the pleadings, the defense may not be 
raised at trial or on appeal. See, e.g.. Merrilees v. Treasurer. State of Vermont. 
618A.2d 1314, 1315 (Vt 1992). 
In this case, Defendant did not raise the doctrine of res judicata as an 
affirmative defense in its Motion to Dismiss. In its motion, Defendant relied solely 
on failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity 
Act. Having never raised res judicata before the trial court, Defendant cannot 
raise the issue before this Court on appeal. Because the defense of res judicata 
8 
was not raised in the Motion to Dismiss, nor at any other time in the lower court 
proceedings, tins umil should in'I ronsidei ih<:' issue now 
In addition, even if the issue of res judicata were properly before this Court, 
Plaintiffs action is not barred. Before the doctrine of res judicata applies, there 
must be a final judgment i H i ihc inenh. See. Bucknerv. Kennard, i'lNM 111 /»i 
1J13, 99 P.3d 842; Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp.. 913 P.2d 731, 733 
(Utah 1995). The federal court dismissal of Plaintiffs claim did not result in an 
adjudication on the merits. Defendant asserts that the case was < IIMI nssw I with 
prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41. However, the very exhibits Defendant cites to 
support its defense disproves such an assertion. In their motion and 
memorandum to dismiss the complaint in federal court, while Defendant sought 
dismissal for failure to comply with a court order, no mention of Rule 41 was ever 
made. (See. Br. of Appellee, Exhibit 9.) Likewise, Judge Kimball's order did not 
refer to Rule 41, nor was the case dismissed with prejudice, but merely dismissed 
without specifics. (See. Br. of Appellee, Exhibit 10.) As such, dismissal of the 
case did not result in a final adjudication on the merits, and res judicata does not 
apply. 
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IV. Plaintiff Was Not Required to Exhaust Administrative Remedies. 
A. The Exhaustion Issue Is Not Properly Before This Court on 
Certiorari Review. 
Like its defense of res judicata, Defendant's defenses regarding failure to 
exhaust are not properly before this Court on certiorari. This Court did not grant 
certiorari with respect to this issue, it was not raised in the Petition for Cert or 
response thereto, and exhaustion of administrative remedies is not fairly 
contained within the limited issue before this Court. Accordingly, this Court 
should disregard Defendants' arguments on that issue. See. Coulter & Smith, at 
856. 
B. Defendant Layton City's Policy Manual Is Not Properly Before 
This Court. 
Even assuming arguendo that Defendant's exhaustion argument is 
properly before this Court, Defendant's argument rests entirely on evidence that 
is not properly part of this Court's record. Defendant Layton City argues that 
Plaintiff deprived the district court, and concomitantly this Court, of subject matter 
jurisdiction by failing to exhaust internal administrative remedies prior to bringing 
suit. In support of this assertion, Defendant attached two excerpts appearing to 
be from a city personnel policy, and argued that they created an absolute 
requirement for Plaintiff to appeal her constructive termination through the city's 
appeal procedures. (Br. of Appellee, Ex. 12, 13.) No such evidence was ever 
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presented to the trial court below, ever properly introduced into the 
record in this case. 
An appellate court should not consider evidence outside of the record on 
appeal. For example, in Chapman v. Chapman, 728 P.2d 121, 122-23 (Utah 
1986), thedefendiinls uigcil IIic, I Idih Suprcim• < mill In nvciluin ,i Mimmary 
judgment order based on responses to interrogatories and requests for 
admission, which were attached to the appellate brief to support the existence of 
factual issues. 11 if omul wink', "Mecause these 'riiisweis' <nc CMIISKJC IIIC ICI mil, 
we cannot consider them." id- at 123. 
In Cooper v. Foresters Underwriters. Inc.. 257 P.2d 540 (Utah 1953), the 
Court was referre< I li i n 11 II i ,i< |iie< I stipulation presentee t 
wrote: 
The record in this case is extremely brief, and the facts presented therein 
so fragmentary and incomplete as to make it impossible for this court to 
render a decision without looking dehors the record.-a process we cannot 
indulge.... We cannot consider facts stated in the briefs which may be true 
but absent in the official record. 
These decisions are consistent with other Utah caselaw rejecting consideration of 
s outside See, e.g... Pratt v. Hollow Irrigation Co 
1169,1172 (Utah 1991)(Court would not consider facts alleged in appellate brief, 
which had no substantiation in the record); Watkins v. Simonds. 385 P.2d 154, 
155 (Utah 1963)(Court would not consider facts alleged in appellate brief, where 
facts before trial court were stipulated to in chambers without preservation of a 
11 
record). 
In the appeal before the Court, Defendant Layton City has attempted to 
circumvent its obligation to present evidence and establish any issues for appeal 
through the record. Indeed, it is attempting to create an ad hoc record on appeal, 
without basis for doing so. Given the improper inclusion of the policy manual 
excerpts in the Appellee's Brief, this Court should give the evidence no 
consideration. As such, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that Plaintiff 
should have exhausted administrative remedies, and this defense should not be 
used to uphold an otherwise improper dismissal of Plaintiffs claims. 
C. Defendant Layton City's Policy Manual Does Not Create an 
Exhaustion Requirement. 
Even assuming arguendo that the policy manual excerpts provided by 
Defendant are properly before this Court, they do not establish exhaustion as a 
prerequisite. First, exhaustion of administrative remedies in this case would have 
been futile and useless. In Beard v. Baum. 796 P.2d 1344 (Alaska 1990), the 
State of Alaska alleged that a constructively discharged employee could not sue 
absent exhausting contractual remedies, as is alleged by Defendant Layton City 
in the case at bar. The Beard Court found that because the grievance procedure 
required the cooperation of the plaintiffs supervisors, a constructively discharged 
employee could not be required to exhaust such remedies, as such an attempt 
12 
would have been futile, id. at 1349. Similarly, in Utah, exhaustion of 
inrlmmistrative irmodK's ni>iy he I'»I U..IN1 vvheii il I/I ulil serve nn II ;e!ul | uipusi-
See, Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 2001 UT 74,f l4, 34 P.3d 180. 
In this matter, Plaintiffs constructive discharge was the result of coercive 
threats by supervisors who would have had extensive influence over 
contractual city appellate procedures. Under that policy, the very supervisors 
who coerced Plaintiff into resigning bore the responsibility of advising Plaintiff of 
her appeal rights. I of Appellee, Ex. 13.) No evidence suggests Plaintiff's 
supervisors so advised her. Furthermore, those same supervisors who forced 
Plaintiff into resigning would no doubt exert significant influence over the internal 
appellate procedure. Given these facts, requiring Plaintiff to exhaust these local 
contractual remedies would be futile, and would serve no useful purpose. 
Furthermore, failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not deprive 
the courts of subject matter jurisdiction, when resort to the administrative 
remedies is not mandatory. In Heinecke v. Dep't. of Commerce. 810 P.2d 459 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), the Respondent claimed that the court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction because of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The 
Petitioner did not take an extra review step, which was permitted him, but not 
required, under the statute. The Heinecke court concluded that because the 
administrative remedy was not mandatory, failure to exhaust did not deprive the 
court of subject matter jurisdiction. 
13 
In the instant case, even though Defendant may have statutory authority to 
create rules and regulations, Defendant's rules do not make appeal with city 
appellate processes mandatory. Defendant's policy states, "In all cases where an 
appointive officer or regular full time employee, other than the City Manager and 
heads of departments, is discharged or transferred to a position with less 
remuneration for any reason, the officer or regular full-time employee shall have 
the right to appeal such discharge or transfer in accordance with this chapter." 
(Br. of Appellee, Exh. 13, p.2.)(Emphasis added.) Defendant's policy does not 
state that the employee "shall" appeal the discharge, or that the employee "must" 
appeal the discharge prior to taking legal action. Instead, Defendant's policy 
makes an internal appeal an option, stating the "employee shall have the right to 
appeal" the termination. Because use of Defendant's appellate procedure was 
not mandatory under their own policies, Defendant cannot now complain that this 
Court and the trial court lack subject matter jurisdiction over the case at bar. 
Conclusion 
As set forth herein, Plaintiffs Complaint sets forth sufficient factual 
allegations to sustain a claim for breach of contractual obligations, exempt from 
the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act. Plaintiffs claims do 
not arise from statute. Furthermore, Defendant Layton City's arguments 
regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies and res judicata are not properly 
14 
before this Court on certiorari. For these reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests 
that tins Court inverse Ihe derision nf Hie < imni of Appeals and district court. 
DATED this .21 ^  day of March, 2005. 
STEVENSON & SMITH 
~4&> K^tt'Vinvu^z 
Brad C. Smith 
Benjamin C Rasmussen 
Attorneys for Machelle Canfield 
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Brad C. Smith, NO. 6656 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
3986 Washington Boulevard 
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Telephone: (801) 394-4573 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH 
MACHELLE CANFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
LAYTON CITY, a Utah 
municipality, 
PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO 
: DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES 
Civil No. 1:02-CV-00041 K 
Judge: Dale A. Kimball 
Defendant. 
Comes now Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and answers 
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories as follows: 
Interrogatory No. 1 : Identify each person whom 5 ou. 
anticipate that you will call or may call as a witness at the 
time of trial < :>f th :i 3 matter and state the topic or subject 
matter upon which each such witnesses will testify, the substance 
of the testimony of each witness with respect to each topic or 
subject matter, and the identity of all documents which relate to 
or concern any such testimony. 
Answer to Interrogatory No, 1: Plaintiff has not yet 
determined who she will call as witnesses at the time of trial, 
when this determination is made, Plaintiff will supplement this 
interrogatory. Plaintiff anticipates that her witnesses may 
include: Debbie PettiJohn, Layton Police Dispatch; Laree Hopkins, 
Layton Police Dispatch; Debbie Joubert, Layton Police Dispatch; 
Blake Haycock, Layton Police Officer; Lt. Quinn Moyes, Layton 
Police; and Lisa Murdock, Layton Police Dispatch. The above 
named individuals have knowledge of the circumstances of my 
separation with Layton City, my "Garrity" hearing, my use of sick 
leave, and my job performance. 
Interrogatory No> 2; Identify all documents that you 
anticipate presenting to a witness or the trier of the fact at 
the trial of this matter, whether as an exhibit or otherwise. 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 2: Machelle Canfield's Leave 
Time Sheet, Memorandum to Lt. Quinn Moyes from Plaintiff Machelle 
Canfield, Certificate to return to work or school from IHC Health 
Center. Plaintiff has not yet determined who she will call as 
witnesses at the time of trial, when this determination is made, 
Plaintiff will supplement this interrogatory. 
Interrogatory No, 3: Describe with specificity all damages 
Ms. Canfield claims she has suffered as a result of the actions 
of the City complained of in her Amended Complaint, and all 
information concerning any such damages, including, without 
limitation: the precise nature of the damages suffered, the 
amount of any such damages, how each damages amount was 
2 
calculated or estimated, and identify each person involved in 
calculating such damages or who otherwise has knowledge of the 
basis for and method of calculation for such damages and 
summarize each such person's involvement and/or knowledge. 
Answer to Interrogatory No, 3: 
Past Wages 
2 July 2001 - 9 January 2002 
unemployed: 
at Layton: 
17.26/hr. X 40 x (211 days / 7) 
= $20,810.63 
15 January 2002 - 5 July 2002 
IRS 
(17.26 - 11.50) x 40 x (171 / 7) 
= $5,628.34 
Future Wages 
5 July 2002 - 2022 
(17.26 - 11.50) x 40 x 52 x 20 = $239,616.00 
Plaintiff is also entitled to general damages for suffering 
and humiliation. Plaintiff anticipates claiming an amount equal 
to front and back pay for general damages. 
The following individuals would have knowledge of the basis 
for and method of calculation for economic damages as they were 
her superiors and they participated in her performance reviews 
and have knowledge of her hourly wage, etc.: 
Lit. Quinn Moyes# Layton Police Dept., 429 N. Wasatch Dr# Layton 
801-546-8300 
Chief Terry Keefe, Layton Police Dept., 429 N. Wasatch Dr, Layton 
801-546-8300 
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Capt. Dave Nance, Layton Police Dept., 429 N. Wasatch Dr, Layton 
801-546-8300 
Interrogatory No, 4; Identify any and all documents, 
including the financial data of Ms. Canfield and any other data 
or information whatsoever used, relied upon, or referred to by 
you in evaluation, calculating or estimation the amount of 
damages you have suffered as a result of the conduct of the City 
complained of in your Amended Complaint, or which otherwise 
supports such claim of damages. 
Answer to Interrogatory No, 4: W-2 forms, tax returns, 
employment evaluations. 
Interrogatory No, 5: Have you contacted or interviewed any 
persons concerning the facts alleged in your Amended Complaint? 
If so, identify each person contacted or interviewed, the 
substance of what was said during such contact or interview, when 
and where such contact or interview occurred; and identify all 
documents evidencing, memorializing or relating to each such 
contact or interview. 
Answer to Interrogatory No, 5; No 
Interrogatory No, 6; Identify each expert witness that you 
will call or may call to give opinion testimony at the trial of 
this matter, and, for each individual identified, state the 
following: Name, address and telephone number of his or her 
employer and/or organization(s) with which he or she is 
4 
associated in any professional capacity; the field in which he or 
she is offered as an expert or to give opinion testimony; a 
summary of his or her qualifications within the field in which he 
or she is expected to testify; the substance of the opinions to 
which he or she is expected to testify and a summary of the 
grounds for each such opinion; all reports and/or publications 
rendered by such expert and all documents relating to or 
concerning such reports and/or publications of such expert's 
opinions; and list and describe each document, photograph or 
other tangible thing with respect to which each such expert is 
expected to testify. 
Answer to Interrogatory No, 6: No experts have presently 
been retained. 
Interrogatory No. 7: Identify each person or entity for whom 
you have performed any work since the termination of your 
employment with the City, and, for each person or entity: state 
the position you held and the dates and hours worked; describe 
all compensation to which you were entitled when performing that-
work, including, but not limited to, salary or other rate of pay, 
overtime compensation, car, travel allowance, meal allowance, 
health insurance, life insurance, disability, other insurance, 
pension or retirement benefits, profit sharing, bonuses, and 
commissions; and identify all documents that support to answer to 
Interrogatory No. 7. 
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Answer to Interrogatory No. 7: Department of Workforce 
Services - July 2001 to January 2002 - Unemployment benefits. 
Internal Revenue Service - January 2002 to Present. IRS offers 
health insurance, life insurance, disability insurance and 
retirement benefits. 
Interrogatory No. 8: Since the termination of your 
employment with the City, have you been self-employed in any 
manner? If so, state the nature of the work you performed in 
your self-employment and the dates or time periods of your self-
employment; the amount you have earned as a result of such self-
employment; and the identity of all documents that support your 
answer to Interrogatory No. 8. 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 8: No. 
Interrogatory No. 9: Itemize all income and other 
compensation you have received since the termination of your 
employment with the City, including in your itemization each date 
you received income, the amount, and the source of that income. 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 9: See tax records attached in 
response to Request for Production of Documents No. 9. 
Interrogatory No. 10: Identify each employer, employment 
service or agency, or other individual or entity with whom you 
have been in contact regarding potential employment since the 
termination of your employment with the City, and, for each such 
person or entity state the date(s) of each such contact, state 
the nature of the employment sought, identify each person you 
communicated with, identify all documents that refer or relate to 
contact with that person or entity, and describe the outcome of 
your contact with that individual or entity. 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 10: See response to Request for 
Production of Documents No. 13. 
Interrogatory No. 11: If you are aware of the existence of 
any written or recorded statement made by any party or potential 
witness, identify the person making the statement, the date of 
the statement, a summary of the contents of the statement, the 
name, address, telephone number and occupation of the person or 
persons taking the statement, and the name, address and telephone 
number of the person now in possession of the original statement. 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 11: Plaintiff is aware that her 
"Garrity" hearing was partially recorded. 
DATED this day of August, 2002. / 
Machelle Canfield/J 
Plaintiff Ls 
Plaintiff's Address: 
3552 W. 5000 S. 
Roy, Utah 84067 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WEBER 
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day of ^ ^Ist^ 2002, at Ogden, Utah, personally 
me Machelle Canfield, the signer of the within 
duly acknowledged to me that she executed the 
til mm /;/ 
, ^Naiv' 
Notary Public 
JULIE S.WILLIAMS 
863 25TH STREET 
OGDEN, UTG4414 
My Commission Expires 
JUNS 88,200* 
SfATiGf UTAH 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Ogden, Utah 
My Commission Expires 
b-'d$-C& 
8 
TabB 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
OCT 19 200* 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
Machelle Canfield, 
Petitioner, 
v. Case No. 20040681-SC 
Layton City, a Utah Municipality, 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed on August 12, 2004. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 4 5 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted only as to the following issue: 
Whether petitioner's complaint stated a sufficient claim for 
the existence of, and violation of, a contract with the 
respondent that was not subject to the immunity and notice of 
claim provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Date Christine M. Durham 
Chief Justice 
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